Birmingham New Street Phase 7 open heart surgery in the Midlands

17th April 2024

Rail Engineer has reported on the extensive West Midlands resignalling a number of times over the years, issue 160 (February 2019) covered the completion of phase 6 between Birmingham New Street (BNS) and Birmingham International stations. So, we were delighted to meet up with main contractor Siemens to learn how things had gone with the final phase 7 and the resignalling of the complex and tight BNS area, which resulted in the final closure of Birmingham New Street Power Signal Box (PSB) on Christmas Eve 2022 with control transferred to the West Midlands Signalling Centre (WMSC) at Saltley. The final phase presented a number of challenges for all involved.

Birmingham New Street station is the UK’s busiest interchange station outside London, handling over 140,000 passengers and around 1,200 trains daily – that is a train movement around every minute. The interlocking, installed in the PSB in the 1960s, was one of the last remaining Westpac Mk1 geographical relay interlockings in the country. Problems such as silver migration were a safety concern, and other assets such as lineside cables and interface relays were becoming fragile. The system wasn’t flexible enough to make the most of the limited infrastructure at the station and, with the increased footfall of passengers expected to increase over the coming years, signalling upgrades were needed.

The platforms at BNS are mainly covered with a large shopping centre above the station. The station’s structure, and its deeply urban nature, significantly reduce accessibility and space to located equipment. The layout of the station is also restrictive, with one bay, 12 through platforms, and four lines at each end of the station. The complex and tight layout results in signals often protecting fouling points that are very close to the signals. Passing a signal at danger, even by a small amount, is likely to infringe a fouling point and cause disruption. It’s also necessary for two trains to frequently occupy one platform, and to split a train or join two trains together.
To squeeze the track and platforms into the limited space, signalling design compromises have always been required. For example, Automatic Warning System (AWS) has never have been provided at BNS. Resignalling to modern standards has increased the challenges to identify and obtain the necessary derogations, and to achieve the operational requirements.

Planning and delivery

Work on BNS phase 7 started in 2017 with a two-year single option development stage, followed by a three-year detailed design, construction, and testing stage. The early planning and definition of the staging approach was crucial to minimise disruption to passengers and freight customers, and required close cooperation between all stakeholders including the many Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) involved.

Under the original programme a six-day commissioning blockade of BNS would have been required, along with four 29-hour blockades. A complete shut down for such a lengthy period would have caused unsustainable disruption. So, the concept of staged interventions was devised. This used Rules of Route access and a full blockade on 25-26 December 2022, together with early closure on 24 December and a later start to services on 27 December. Services through and around the station ceased for 72 hours while 352 staff implemented the final elements of the scheme.

This approach involved 83 compressed stages carried out over two years, with rehearsals of the major stages in order to reduce risk of disruption in the final commissioning stage. Non-disruptive access was used throughout, which further complicated the planning work required.

This stage working approach required 12 platform closures, with the affected platforms segregated from the adjacent platform to minimise disruption and to maximise workforce safety. Through constant reviews the team managed a wide range of planned and unexpected events. During 2022, more than five million people visited the city during the Commonwealth Games, doubling the city centre’s footfall. The 70th anniversary of Queen Elizabeth’s accession to the throne and the resulting jubilee celebrations saw another surge of rail demand, as did travel around the time of the Queen’s funeral later that year.

The greatest challenge to the project however was Covid-19, which radically changed the way work could be delivered. Strict health and safety protocols had to be adopted to protect the workforce and minimise the risk of infection. Train ridership plummeted, but the importance of services to and through the station for key workers and critical freight services remained, and work had to continue with minimised disruption.

Over the four years of detailed design, the project integrated over 300 improvements of varying sizes that hadn’t been detailed within the original scope. This included on-track additional walkways to allow drivers to leave cabs safely.

Signalling technology

The Westpac Mk1 signalling was replaced by a processor-based Trackguard Westlock interlocking located in the WMSC along with the new control system. The Westlock manages Westrace Trackside System (WTS) equipment throughout the area, located in trackside location cases or relocatable equipment buildings, and connected over the Fixed Telecommunication Network (FTN).

Manufactured in the UK, this was the first deployment of this digital railway technology in the West Midlands, and introduced benefits such as faster route setting, the ability to operate with longer tail cables and improved immunity to traction interference, with the extensive use of fibre-optic instead of copper cables. Being processor based, the system is more flexible should modifications or changes be required and is capable of being used with ETCS.

Several novel signal indicators and axle counter developments were required to reduce clearances, compared to normal signalling. Thales axle counters were used for train detection and the signals replaced with LED units. The sheer scale of the project is such that 114 signals, 228 axle counter sections, 30 location cases, and eight relocatable equipment buildings were installed along with 11,000 metres of cable troughing protects, 78,000 metres of power and fibre cabling, and 245,000 metres of tail cables. For the power system, 35 Functional Supply Points (FSPs), four Principal Supply Points (PSPs), two Distribution Network Operator Cubicles (DNOs), and two 25kV ‘take offs’ from the Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) were also installed.

Plug coupling was widely used for the points (requiring retrofitting of plug coupled connections for many assets) and new signals in order to allow rapid changeover during rehearsals and the main commissioning.

Special bespoke brackets were designed to hold the mid-platform signals. The brackets wrap neatly around the bulkhead cladding fixing on the structural concrete beams to provide sufficient headroom on the platforms. This required careful design to work around station lighting systems to ensure compliant illumination.

Cable management provided another challenge, with hundreds of cables from the equipment rooms fanning out to equipment located around the station. This required excavations on each platform, often by hand, to allow cross-platform cable routes to be installed. Most of this work was carried out during short overnight possessions with the platforms reinstated, cleaned, and reopened for passenger use each morning.

Innovations

A number of new approaches were taken, some for efficiency, and some to meet the specific needs of the project. Twenty-six Train Despatch Equipment Units (TDEUs) were installed to show train despatchers information about the current status of the signalling in order to improve the number of on time departures. These innovative units were developed to provide improved efficiency, reducing risk of human error, and safer train dispatch.

Two 900 square foot, climate controlled, equipment rooms were built on site at the ‘A’ end of the station to optimise the use of restricted space, to comply with the sub surface fire regulations, and to allow construction while the station remained open for passengers. Each room houses the equivalent signalling control equipment of four traditional REBs along with separate rooms for telecoms and Electrical & Plant (E&P) equipment.

Combined with the longer tail cables that can be used with WTS, this allows a centralisation of the trackside control equipment, reducing the quantity of trackside location cases and reducing the risk of staff accessing and working in trackside locations in the confined environment.

At the ‘B’ end of the station, space was freed up by moving redundant equipment. This allowed the use of more traditional signalling REBs, although some ‘double stacking’ was necessary to fit everything into the space available.

In order to help drivers and signallers fully understand the new signalling, extensive use was made of simulator-based training. Twenty-six signallers used an interactive 3D representation of the routes into the station to familiarise themselves with the changes. A 3D model of a train cab was created to allow drivers to virtually learn the route. This not only provided a safe system to train but also allowed useful feedback to further improve operational effectiveness.

Relocatable temporary signals at platform ends were used in order to facilitate the platform closures required. These allowed the new signals to be installed during each stage and enabled rapid changes to the signalling layout. The bases and posts were designed to be modular and adjustable, allowing them to be relocated around the station for the following stages.

Traditionally, in Great Britain, signalling tail cables are limited to 200 metres in areas of OLE to reduce the risk of induced voltages causing failures or false operation. This traditionally meant that a suite of signalling location cases is required near to most signals. Longer tail cables allow fewer lineside location cases/REBs for a more efficient design, particularly where space is constrained. The cost savings to provide safe accessible location suites were significant.

The pioneering use of long tail cables in Network Rail, required extensive modelling, site testing of induced voltages, detailed analysis, and on-site equipment trials to demonstrate safe and reliable operation. This saved the need for five location suites and the methodology developed is now being replicated on projects across the country.

Thales axle counters were used, these being the local standard for train detection. However, a number of developments were introduced for the complex and compressed BNS track layout, with some clearances reduced by half following analysis and site testing. Reliability was enhanced through the use of two-out-of-three, rather than the traditional two-out-of-two processor architecture.

Communication between the axle counter processors was via fibre optic links. A direct communication link was also used between the axle counters and the Trackguard Westlock interlocking, the first time this had been done in Network Rail, and this removed the need for a relay interface. Duplicate axle counter heads with diverse cable routes were also used to allow automatic changeover between heads should one fail or suffer a cable strike.

Given the restrictive nature of the site, localised modelling was used to position key signals and indicators to exceptionally fine margins to achieve the requirements of the signal sighting process and assess potential ‘read-across’ issues.

Control system technology

As part of phase 7, the BNS area was recontrolled using a processor-based Controlguide Westcad workstation located at the WMSC. Train operator staff are now co-located with Network Rail signalling staff so that they can work together to problem solve more cohesively and reactively. This reduces the impact of late running services or platform changes by use of the modern control system to increase route reliability and platform flexibility.

A number of modifications were made to vastly improve railway operations. Although the system delivered in the 1960s allowed for some bidirectional movement in the station area, this was not possible on the approaches. The phase 7 work created a bi-directional loop for Platforms 1 to 7 (via Monument Lane) and Platforms 7 to 12 (via Five Ways and the Gloucester line) in addition to connection to a number of new sidings. This improves flexibility and allows line speeds to be increased to reduce journey times.

Extensive telecoms work was also required. This involved designing and installing three new nodes on the FTNx IP telecoms network and 10 existing nodes were upgraded. A two-stage approach was taken to create the telecoms network to allow signalling rehearsal testing 12 months before the final commissioning, with a controlled changeover to the final configuration. At the WMSC the existing analogue telecoms concentrator was replaced with a digital system to improve call handling.

Sustainability

All partners in the project committed to sustainable delivery, as they were very aware of the large number of railway neighbours that were likely to be affected by the work. One example was the creation of a new, award-winning site welfare/depot facility, around 2km from BNS on an undeveloped site. Having been cleared and improved, the new depot was fully solar powered, saving around 75,000kg of CO2 emissions over three years.

Electric tools and equipment were used to reduce emissions and to improve safety by reducing the flammable liquids on site. Battery-operated power tools, mobile elevating work platforms, solar powered welfare units, and solar powered tower lighting all contributed to the sustainability objective.

Delivery of the PSPs and REBs at Monument Lane required a 1,000-tonne crane lift over the main lines to Wolverhampton from an adjacent park. A temporary access road and pad were constructed, which involved cordoning off a section of a primary school playing field. Siemens Mobility worked closely with the both the school and council, and supported the school with construction of a new sensory space and the city with a donation to the charity Trees for Life, to support the planting of more trees.

Occupational safety

Getting everyone home safe every day is a Network Rail commitment, so as part of the safety strategy, and with most of the work under cover and in the confined station area, a plan had to be implemented for preventing dust inhalation. Tools with dust extractors were used to protect the teams. Throughout the Covid-19 emergency, even greater protection measures had to be implemented, so air-fed face masks were used to overcome the hazards from the dusty environment, which then formed part of the project’s Covid-19 protection measures.

Conclusion

There was no chance of a lengthy closure due to the geographical location of BNS and the critical nature of the infrastructure to the economy. By adopting a collaborative approach, using detailed knowledge of the existing infrastructure and an innovative application of digital technologies, the team successfully delivered a major upgrade with minimal disruption, despite a wide range of challenges.

Passengers and freight operators are already seeing an improvement in their journeys through this central hub, with fewer unplanned stops outside the station and more on-time arrivals.

With thanks to Steve Bick, project director, and Andrew Cardiff, senior project manager at Siemens Mobility Limited for their help with this article.

Lead image credit: Siemens

Siemens Mobility boost for Chippenham

17th April 2024

The recent announcement by Siemens Mobility to invest £100 million in the building of new premises in Chippenham was well received and duly reported by press releases on 4 March. Some of us were lucky to be invited to the associated press conference where the guest of honour was Chancellor of the Exchequer Jeremy Hunt. The press briefing gave details of what will be entailed but behind the scenes, the rail magazines were given the opportunity to probe deeper into the decision making behind the investment and the plans for Siemens Mobility’s future in the rail signalling business.

A brief history

Those of us who have been in the railway signalling business for decades will associate Chippenham with the Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company. The origins go back much further than that. It was in 1856 that Saxby began to design and build signalling systems and equipment, and, in 1897, Saxby & Farmer opened a factory in Chippenham to meet the growing demand for signalling both in the UK and across the empire. In 1935, Westinghouse took control and continued to expand the site until the mid-Twentieth century.

Eventually, Westinghouse was acquired by Hawker Siddeley in 1979 which was then then bought by BTR in 1992. Shortly after this, BTR merged with Siebe and became Invensys, continuing the signalling operation until finally Siemens acquired the business in 2013 to merge it with its signalling interests in Germany and other locations in Europe.

Some notable developments emanated from the site down the years, notably the London Underground Victoria Line automatic train control system in 1968 and participation in the development of solid state interlocking of which the first example was introduced at Leamington Spa in 1985. The Victoria Line system was replaced with a ‘distance to go’ radio based ATO system in 2012, which has performed very well since then. This pedigree of expertise was recognised by the German company, which made the site the leader of signalling development for both the UK and the wider market.

Siemens has been in Britain since 1900 where it was instrumental in introducing the first submarine cable link between England and India, then on to laying cables across the Atlantic. The company regards Britain as its second home and has many premises in the UK other than railway signalling. Another important part of Siemens is the factory at Poole where it designed the train mobile radio for GSM-R, although manufacture of the radios has now transferred to Chippenham. Radio communication is an essential element of the ERTMS progression.

Siemens is well established in the rolling stock business and its recently-opened factory in Goole will be manufacturing the new trains for London Underground’s Piccadilly Line. Many other trains in the UK have been provided by Siemens including the Thameslink Class 700, the GN Inner Suburban Class 717, and the main line fleet for South Western Railway, and 587 of the trains supplied are maintained by Siemens depots around the country. Altogether, Siemens employs 5,500 people in the UK.

Existing Chippenham site

The expansion of the signalling business over the years led to a piecemeal development of the premises just on the north side of Chippenham railway station. It had its own rail sidings for many years and had several buildings geared to designing and manufacturing the signalling equipment of the time. It also had its own foundry to cast metal for the many structures and mechanical components as part of the signalling portfolio. The foundry no longer exists and is now only a pile of rubble.

Whilst the headquarters block remains, together with some factory units suitably adapted for the emerging signalling technology, some of the old buildings are in a derelict or semi derelict condition. This does not present the image of a modern-day signalling company, hence the need for new premises. Some of the land nearest to the railway has already been developed into a retail park and the entire site (which Siemens does not own) will be used to develop housing and other local amenity facilities.

The new site

The new factory and laboratories will be on greenfield land on the south side of Chippenham in the SouthPoint business park. Planning consent is at an advanced stage and the new premises are expected to open in 2026. The new building will incorporate all the latest sustainability standards promoting environmental and socially responsible structures.

As well as accommodating the office-based staff, there will be manufacturing, design, project engineering and research & development (R&D) facilities. Of the 800 staff who will transfer to the new site, 160 of these will be associated with R&D (there are a total of 300 staff working on R&D for signalling across the various Siemens UK companies). The aim is to have a seamless move so as not to disrupt design and production for the various signalling projects that the company has orders for. The skill sets that have been built up over the years are considerable, hence the decision to remain in Chippenham. It is intended that the research and manufacturing units will be the most modern of their kind in the whole world.

Presenting the opportunities

In the announcements made at the press briefing and subsequent interview sessions, Jeremy Hunt remarked that the government will back this plan as it is seen as a revival of manufacturing in the UK. The country must become a global leader of industry based upon technology. Manufacturing is 10% of the UK economy and this must grow. Artificial Intelligence, Life Sciences (medicines and vaccines), Film and TV, Automotive, Aerospace, and Railways, are all part of this growth plan. Emphasis must also be put on export. The old model of R&D in the UK but with manufacturing elsewhere in the world, is no longer acceptable. There is a need to shake off the negativity that so often prevails and restore our self-belief, he said. Tax reliefs of up to 25% will be there to encourage this objective.

Rob Morris, the joint CEO of Siemens Mobility, observed that much of the UK’s signalling infrastructure is approaching the end of its economic life. Some notable recent projects have included the CBTC on the centre section of the Elizabeth Line, the re-signalling at Birmingham New Street, the Core Valleys upgrade in South Wales and the ongoing East Coast Digital Programme (ECDP).

In the immediate future, contracts are in place for the work in mid-Cornwall to replace old mechanical signalboxes and the reopening of the Northumberland Line to Ashington. However, much more needs to be done and a long-term strategy has to evolve if the boom-and-bust type of business is to be avoided. The announcement of a five-year renewal programme for signalling will help this.

The ongoing Siemens Mobility product line will include both the deployment of ETCS and the continuance of modular signalling systems that have helped to reduce costs for secondary routes. The roll out of ETCS in the UK remains painfully slow, and even the much-publicised ECDP only covers from London to just short of Grantham, which is about a quarter of the entire route.

The company is well aware that the radio bearer for ETCS, which is currently GSM-R and obsolete in terms of its technology, has to be renewed in the next 5-10 years. The successor will be FRMCS based on 5G technology and Siemens intends to participate in that renewal once the business intent is made known. Another innovation is the possibility of cloud based interlockings where interlockings from different manufacturers can be remotely accessed to improve flexibility and reduction in cost. The existing Siemens interlocking types Westrace and Westlock will remain in production for both UK projects and others in the wider world.

Chippenham will work alongside the sister Siemens Mobility company in Braunschweig which has around 4,000 employees engaged on projects in Europe and around the world. €60 million has been invested here over the past five years. The Chippenham site already manufactures relays for Germany.

A nice touch to enhance the proceedings was to have Yasmin Rawle, a Strategy and Business Development graduate, tell of her involvement inside the company which goes back to four generations of her family. Employing graduates and apprentices will continue in increasing numbers once the new site is opened.

A final comment from Andrew Haines, the chief executive of Network Rail, emphasised the importance of rail growth in the UK where £43 billion is allocated to rail investment over the next four-year period of which re-signalling will be a significant element of this. Small and medium enterprises are predicted to be 50% of the suppliers to Siemens in the ongoing signalling modernisation.

The future beckons

The news of Siemens Mobility’s investment has been well received by the local community, the signalling industry and, perhaps more importantly, existing employees. It ensures that a major contributor to signalling design and manufacture will remain in the UK, both to serve the home market of main line and metro operation as well as opening up new opportunities for export.

Whilst a few may shed a tear when the old site finally closes, it is no longer fit for purpose and it is time to move on. Rail Engineer will continue to keep in touch and report on progress with the new facilities as the building work gets underway.

Lead image credit: Siemens Mobility UK

Cyber security in rail

17th April 2024

Rail Engineer has previously published articles on cyber security, and it is a subject that will be undoubtedly covered many times in the future. Protecting data and keeping systems safe is still not universally recognised as something we should all be doing, and instances of hacking with damaging and often costly results happen all too frequently. It is necessary to issue and re-issue ever present reminders about the threats and how they can be spotted and managed to avoid business disruption or unsafe situations.

Railways in general are well aware of the risks involved, and most administrations do understand the broader measures needed to keep the trains running safely and the operational processes intact. However cyber attacks do occur, often because the circumstances are not perceived as possible, and the resulting loss of service can be very embarrassing.

A recent IET webinar given by Stefano Saccomani and Richard Thomas from AtkinsRéalis told of the ever-changing face of cyber threats within the rail landscape.

Known incidents

Three incidents were described and analysed:

In October 2022, the train Danish operator DSB suddenly found that numerous trains were being cancelled. A crucial test environment provided by Supeo took down vital interfaces. The investigation found that a single failure of one system took down many other systems. A third-party supplier was the single source of failure and the risks had not been properly assessed.
In August 2023, the sending of emergency stop messages in Poland brought 20 trains to a halt. The impact of these stops affected many other services, and the problem took six hours to resolve. The cause was the VHF train radio system, an open channel with no encryption, which had been accessed by outsiders. The radio documentation could be accessed easily, with very poor assumptions made that the system would not be of external interest.
In December 2023, again in Poland, a supply chain software malfunction caused a denial of service that affected train services. The train manufacturer was aware of cyber threats, but the software did not perform as well as intended. There was a general lack of awareness of the software’s state, made worse by additional interfaces that provided entry points to the system.

These are just three examples of what can happen and impact on the operational railway, but other instances exist. More common is hacking of business services that promote train travel, sell tickets, make reservations and suchlike that interface with the travelling public.

The Digital Railway

A phrase that crops up regularly in technical articles is the ‘Digital Railway’. The term is banded about by many people who do not really understand what it is all about or what is involved. In the past, most railway applications were individual systems, for example radio, customer information, train performance and reporting, all without much connectivity.

With the demand for better information all round, much greater connectivity is occurring as part of the digital transformation, leading to a diverse architecture and an extension of existing architectures. There is a convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) with new dependencies and more access points. Software-based solutions are commonplace, even before the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being considered. All of this is a hunting ground for hackers, whether or not the intent is criminal or otherwise.

Regulation, legislation, and standards

As can be expected, a host of guidance documentation has been prepared to help and direct organisations into protection measures against cyber attacks. These are at an international, national and railway level. Locating all these and then understanding them can be something of a challenge but much of the guidance amounts to common sense actions. These may not always be obvious until they are pointed out. In all of this it must be remembered that cyber security is a challenge for all rail engineering disciplines and, as is explained later, it is the connectivity of systems that is creating the digital railway. This connectivity is the potential window for hackers to access systems and it must be understood to a much higher degree.

The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 enforced the need for providers of public electronic communications networks and services to take all necessary steps to prevent cyber threats from disrupting communications networks that are vital to the continuance of everyday business in the country. Ofcom has the duty to define the security requirements and to make sure that telecom providers take all necessary steps to comply. While initially aimed at the public telecom operators, the railway must be equally compliant in fulfilling the requirements of the Act. Since the advent of fibre optic cables and associated transmission, the telecoms arm of Network Rail has become the universal ‘pipe’ for many operational applications including signalling and electric traction control.

Internationally, the subject is led by the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) and specifically its group TC9 Electrical Equipment and Systems for Railways. The IEC has been in existence since 1906 so is well established in the field of electrical standards and safety. For cyber security, the document IEC 63452 relating to safety levels for rail operators and suppliers, is embracing cyber security work with a new document IEC 62443 entitled Railway Cyber Security Regulations being produced. It is expected this will be published shortly.

Nationally, the British Standards Institute (BSI) is co-ordinating and focussing these IEC documents for the UK rail applications. A committee is established to produce a guidance document.

In Rail, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) produces standards that impact on the whole industry and RIS 2700 RST gives guidance on the verification of control measures for engineering change to rail vehicles. From this, standard TN111 details types of cyber security control measures for rail vehicles.

Within Network Rail the document TS 50701 is derived from IEC 63452 and gives guidance for rail applications.

If you’re already confused, it wouldn’t be a surprise. Understanding the best means for protecting against cyber attacks can be time consuming and the available documentation is hard to interpret.

For rolling stock projects, it has been established that a separate assurance chain is needed from a regulatory viewpoint, hence the emergence of TN111. Rolling stock design and operation contains air gaps, in situ on board systems that link to the outside world, balise readers that link to the signalling system, and a multitude of radio and satellite links that give operational performance information. All these interfaces must be cyber assured.

Managing the IT / OT divide

Both IT and OT have different assurance regimes, but a number of systems have to understand and manage the differences. The focus for IT is confidentiality of data whereas OT requires integrity and availability. For both of these, the connectivity of systems using telecom and data linkage is vital to the business objectives of the railway and the interfaces that have emerged create the opportunity for security breaches and cause operational limitations. Some of the systems where conflicts of interest may occur are:

Digital Signalling. Very rarely are such projects undertaken at greenfield sites. As such, the design of a project must be aware of security already embedded in existing systems and designers should beware of assuming that the existing security is both fit for purpose and safe. There is a need to establish a ‘road map’ to enhance and leverage security capability within the products being used to ensure the security of the eventual project solution. This will involve interfaces across many stakeholders, and it can be difficult to interrogate the security of different manufacturers. Expectations should be shared and agreed with every party at an early stage.
Traffic Management Systems (TMS). To be effective, TMS must extract and assemble data from many sources, for example timetable data, train describer information, platform planning, rolling stock capability, train crew diagrams, and potential conflicting movements. All of these are vulnerable to cyber attacks which can impact on the resultant train plan. As such, there has to be a compromise between IT and OT that may end up recognising the vulnerability of the final information but without compromising safety.
Driver Advisory Systems (DAS). Again, a number of inputs are required to produce the correct information as to the way a train is being driven. These include timing points along the railway, the current location of a train (derived usually from satellite positioning), train describer steps, train speed, and potential conflict with other train movements (this will be important for Connected DAS applications). These are all systems that can be accessed and hacked by third parties, and which represent an ever-present risk. It is therefore essential that DAS remains an advisory system and must never replace the information provided by the signalling system.

There will be other systems with multiple inputs that will impact on the business rather than the operational railway and can seriously affect the conducting of day-to-day business of selling train travel.

Future developments and monitoring

The current regulatory regime has been mentioned but increased regulation of cyber security for critical infrastructure is on its way. The EU National Infrastructure Security (NIS) Directive is already in being, and the EU Cyber Resilience Act is expected in 2024. Other countries as well as the UK are providing new regulation. These include the USA, Australia, Singapore, and the UAE. All this is fine, but does it further confuse the future situation?

From all of this, there is a need to improve incident reporting requirements and an identification of critical dependencies. Logging and monitoring must be better managed in order to recognise when something is not performing as expected. Vulnerability management must recognise that assets cannot be introduced, proved, and then forgotten. Asset life is also a consideration for railways, especially where systems and products are intended to last several decades. Regular security updates will be needed over the entire asset life.
Everyone has a part to play, and regular training on cyber awareness is needed. A positive and open reporting culture should lead to improved leverage and replication of best practice. As in safety practice, volunteer reporting of ‘near misses’ should be encouraged.

The way forward

Rail engineers will understand the V life cycle – requirements, development, design, build, test, integration, commissioning, maintenance, updates, and decommissioning. The V cycle tracks the interaction between these phases as a project progresses. Cyber security impacts on all of them and the people involved in each stage need to understand the risks that could arise.
Achieving this will secure some early wins so everyone should be educated to know:

Security applies to all staff.
Consideration of the whole life cycle.
Establishment of a cyber security culture.
An understanding of what is out there now and potential exposures.
Investment in logging and monitoring and how it is practised.
Knowledge on how to combat attacks and recover from them.

More specialised staff must be able to identify data flows, their direction, and concentrations.

If this sounds too generalised and impractical for everyone to take in, then put in place some realistic measures that will help the overall security. Carry out an exercise to create proportionate assumptions which could contain knowing what is most likely to ‘stop the railway’. Determine where the ‘crown jewels’ are, namely the critical elements of running trains and how they can be compromised. Be rational but be organised to manage the architecture of systems through constant live monitoring.

Some recommendations

Previous articles on cyber security have detailed the obvious steps to avoid being infected with unwanted intrusion: forbidding staff to use personal USB sticks or disks that might contain malware to access systems; not leaving computers switched on overnight in unmonitored environments; checking the credentials of people who have access to systems especially third parties brought in to carry out updates. It all sounds blindingly obvious but is often forgotten.

More focussed recommendations are as follows:

Know your ‘bill of materials’ both hardware and software.
Run ‘day in the life’ exercises and exercises to identify root causes.
Know the difference between a cyber attack and a software bug.
Work together to perform incident management.
Understand the whole life situation including how to carry out patching and updating.
Know the vulnerability of assets and have an obsolescence plan.
Plan for graceful transitions.
Ensure training and documentation is regularly updated.
Set clear requirements and expectations.
Understand how a recovery situation will work.

Some of you may find this all a bit much to take in and that is understandable. There will be a need to employ cyber security experts, and larger organisations should already have these in place. Smaller companies should have someone named for IT management and they will have responsibility for keeping systems safe. This might require calling in further expertise if problems occur.

Work on the basis that an attack will happen rather than believing you have the necessary steps in place and are safe from attack. Big organisations have suffered, for instance the British Library was attacked in 2023 with many of its processes seriously affected. Only now is it recovering from this.

There is no final solution as hackers are constantly finding new ways of accessing systems. Constant vigilance is needed. Above all, take the issues of cyber security seriously and don’t regard it as something that happens to other people.

For more information on cyber security, readers may like to refer to the following Rail Engineer articles: