Britain’s mainline railway is one of the safest in Europe and the number of level crossing incidents are well below the European average. However, the Railway Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) estimates that 6% of the total mainline system risk is from level crossings. The majority of this risk is borne by members of the public using the crossings and every incident has the potential for significant human and economic loss. While society reluctantly accepts road risk, every rail incident will understandably make the headlines.
All infrastructure managers have a legal duty under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) to minimise risk, so far as is reasonably practicable. This applies to the approximate 5,500 level crossings on the mainline rail network, a further 1,500 on heritage and minor railways, and a small number of crossings in rail depots.
ORR level crossing strategy
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) says its strategy for level crossing regulation includes ensuring continued improvement in risk management by embedding the use of its guidance – Principles for Managing Level Crossing Safety – for all level crossing risk assessments. Assessments should be drawn up by competent people who have a proper knowledge of the risks and control measures associated with crossings, as well as a good understanding of the behaviour of users and their perception of risk.
The ORR wants to encourage research, innovation, and new technologies to improve risk control at level crossings, and to target its interventions on the highest risk areas. For the mainline railway this means passive footpath and user-worked crossings and Automatic Half-Barrier (AHB) crossings.
The ORR says that the closure of level crossings must be the first option considered in any risk-control strategy. Alternatives to crossings must be fully explored and delivered where reasonably practicable, and the ORR does not support the creation of new level crossings where there is a reasonably practicable alternative.
For a passive footpath user-worked level crossing, the user has to determine if it is safe to cross. This can be based on sighting alone, the sound of a train horn in some circumstances or, where telephone is provided, by calling the signaller. There has been a welcome reduction in the number of passive level crossings over the last four years, with either closure or replacement with an active level crossing, but this leaves over 60% of the level crossing population as passive level crossings. An active level crossing is where the level crossing user is warned of the approach of the train through closure of gates or barriers, and/or by warning lights and/or alarms.
There are still nearly 400 AHB crossings on the main line network, where the approaching train activates the closure sequence for the level crossing automatically. There are no protecting signals and the crossing area is not checked to ensure it is clear prior to the arrival of the train, and, as the name suggests, half barriers are provided to ensure no one is trapped in the crossing area. But this also means users can ‘weave around’ the barriers when they are down. However, AHB crossings are very convenient for the user, due to their short barrier down time, and providing a crossing with a greater barrier down time could encourage misuse.
There has been welcome closure of a number of passive level crossings (approximately 1% of the crossing population) over the last four years, but these have been the ‘low hanging fruit’ and it is increasingly difficult to close level crossings. As we are a crowded island, it is not easy to build underpasses and bridges to replace level crossings, and the capital cost of a structure will be far greater than providing an active level crossing. Whole life cost of a structure (which will have much longer life) could be lower than an active level crossing but would need a much larger initial budget and the space to build one.
Closing level crossings needs to take into account many factors, including the legal arrangements for closing rights of way (which can be significant), the need to minimise the possible transfer of risk to other crossings, and the possibility of importing new dangers, such as increasing the likelihood of trespass, or requiring users to use busy alternative roads. While this may reduce the safety risk to the railway it could increase risk to the user.
Level crossing order
When any railway line was authorised by an Act of Parliament, the type of level crossing on any route was prescriptively described in the Act. To avoid a new Act of Parliament when a level crossing is changed, the ORR is authorised to issue Level Crossing Orders (on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport), and then to inspect level crossings to ensure that the measures in the Order are in place and being complied with. The ORR streamlined and simplified its process in 2022, in order to better promote technology developments.
Responsibility for level crossing risk is primarily with the railway infrastructure manager, working with the train operating companies, local authorities, highways agencies, and users of the crossing. Co-operation and collaboration are critical and each stakeholder has a role to play.
The level crossing equipment, such as gates, barriers, warning lights, alarms, and signs must be kept under review through a regular reassessment of risks, and may need to be changed if the risk profile at the crossing alters. For example, if there are changed traffic levels (road vehicles, pedestrians, and/or trains), a different mix of users, a new school or housing development, or different user behaviours are identified.
In the 10 years from April 2013 to March 2023, there were 61 fatalities to level crossing users on the mainline railway (excluding suicides). Table 1 shows the types of crossing where they occurred.
The greatest proportion of fatalities occurred at passive footpath crossings, followed by AHB and UWC-T.
There were also 67 vehicular collisions in the same 10 years and AHB crossings were the greatest contributor with 34% of all incidents, with AHBs 7% of the total number of crossings. The ORR provides guidance on situations where it considers AHB crossings are inappropriate, and Network Rail is also trialling the use of equipment to deter unsafe use (such as weaving around the barriers).
Each crossing type has a different risk profile. The RSSB Safety Risk Model models this risk by considering factors such as level crossing protection, road and rail traffic over the crossing, and train speed. The results show that the risk of collisions between trains and road vehicles is greatest at AHB, UWC-T, and UWC-MSL crossings, and that the greatest proportion of the risk to pedestrians is at footpath crossings, rather than from pedestrian use of any other type of crossing.
Heritage railways
The ORR says that the majority of heritage railways have level crossings as part of their operation. Its survey of level crossing types in the heritage sector found that around 16% of these public carriageway crossings were public open level crossings, with half being automatic with lights Automatic Open Crossings Locally Monitored (AOCL), and half being crossings with signage only – where the train driver is required to observe that the crossing is clear. These are known as Open Crossings (OC). There were nine collisions between trains and vehicles on the heritage railways sector between April 2013 to March 2023, but none of these resulted in reported injuries to the vehicle or train occupants, possibly due to the lower train speeds involved.
Heritage railways generally operate at lower speeds not exceeding 25mph (40kmph), and when compared to the mainline sector, the lower speed profile changes the level of risk with level crossings. However, the risk remains significant and the ORR level crossing strategy remains relevant to the heritage sector. The same legislation applies, and the ORR expects the heritage sector to achieve the same legal standard as the mainline sector.
Risk at level crossings should be reduced as far as is reasonably practicable. The ORR says it is therefore important that heritage operators understand the risk profile of all of their level crossings through the production of a suitable and sufficient risk assessment, identifying control measures, and ensuring that these are implemented effectively.
Level crossings need to be regularly inspected by competent persons to ensure the control measures remain effective. Risk assessments also need to be regularly reviewed and the risks reassessed, as well as after an incident or when significant change in use is likely or has occurred. This includes changes in train type or operation, user profile, local developments, or infrastructure enhancement/renewal. The reviews may indicate that changes are justified, such as closure, an alternative crossing method, or different type of level crossing.
As the heritage sector hopefully expands and extends or reinstates old railway lines, the opening or reinstatement of level crossings may increase. In line with the general principles of prevention, the ORR expects operators to demonstrate that there is no reasonably practicable alternative to the provision of a new or reinstated level crossing, based upon a suitable and sufficient risk assessment.
Level crossing improvements
From Control Period 6 (CP6) 2019–2024, the ORR recognised that Network Rail does not have additional ring-fenced funds to improve level crossing safety, and that decision making was devolved to the routes and regions. In line with statutory requirements, reasonably practicable improvements in risk control were adopted, and Network Rail focused on using better techniques and digital technologies to improve the maintenance, management, and taking further steps to reduce risk to the public at level crossings.
A range of MSL systems have been developed and approved, together with far better red /green lights. MSL crossings can make a passive crossing active, although if there is a stopping / non stopping station or diverging junction between the crossing and its strike in point, the MSL will need interfacing with the signalling system. This will increase the cost and the time to deploy.
Network Rail now has a team of dedicated level crossing managers in place, which is a great initiative to improve level crossing safety. Level crossings are inspected by the managers at a frequency based on the level of risk of the crossing, typically from every 7 weeks to every 12 months.
During the inspections the level crossing managers check for any defects at the crossing that may pose a risk to users, trains, or vehicles. Where faults or defects are minimal (vegetation or sign cleaning) they may be resolved by the managers themselves immediately, or they will raise the defects for repair by the maintenance teams. The level crossing managers act as ‘owner’ of the crossings and undertake risk assessments, and liaise and communicate with local users of the crossings, such as schools.
Work is underway with the University of Southampton to better understand human behaviour and decision making at level crossings. This sets out to help improve safety at level crossings by developing a deeper understanding of how people behave at them, and creating decision support tools for level crossing managers, engineers, safety teams, and investigators.
Signage at level crossings has been improved over the last 10 years, but work is planned to simplify and improve level crossing signage even further. Public highway behaviour improvement is also being looked at and flexible tips to discourage AHB weaving are being trialled, together with improved LED barrier lights. To reduce the whole-life cost of level crossings, COTS PLC level crossing controllers to replace bespoke controllers is the way forward, together with digital CCTV systems for remote level crossing operation. Barrier machine reliability is also being looked at, together with Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to improve level crossing behaviour and design.
The ORR says it will continue to monitor Network Rail’s progress against its targets and encourage it to continue implementing its level crossing strategy to reduce risk across the whole crossing population.
‘Transforming Level Crossings 2015 – 2040’ outlines Network Rail’s long-term strategy to improve level crossing safety in Great Britain. The strategy provides the details of the work Network Rail will undertake to improve level crossing safety, by detailing the work that needs to be done to the end of CP91 (March 2039). This will allow Network Rail to plan long-term across a number of funding periods.
Key elements of the strategy include continued focus on targeted level crossing closures, making all passive crossings active, illuminating all telephone and whistle boards crossings, prioritising the removal of AHBs near to stations and schools, more red-light safety cameras at public road level crossings, and ensuring that the whole organisation is involved in the strategy.
Image credit: iStockphoto.com/Jorge Eliza Quibel